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ALIQUID: A FORGOTTEN TRANSCENDENTAL

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1. Introduction

My claim in this contribution is that the role and significance of the transcendental *aliquid* for the thought of Thomas Aquinas has hitherto remained largely not-understood in the Thomistic literature. I further advance the thesis that *aliquid* leads us into the innermost center of the metaphysics of Saint Thomas and reveals to us its fundamental structural principle.

Against my title one could rightly object that the tradition of Thomism has never entirely "forgotten" *aliquid* as such; after all — one will say — the old handbooks of scholastic philosophy as a rule offer a short presentation of the Thomistic doctrine of *aliquid* together with the other transcendentals *ens*, *res*, *unum*, *verum*, and *bonum*. I am of the view that these presentations remain unsatisfying. It is true that, outside the handbooks, one occasionally finds in the literature scattered indications of the speculative potential of the doctrine of *aliquid*. But these indications remain, when they are not indeed misleading, summary and in need of further elaboration. I would like to briefly review some examples of the treatment of *aliquid* in the handbooks and other secondary literature.

2. Brief Survey of the Literature

Joseph Gredt distinguishes, in his classic textbook "*Elementa philosophiae aristotelico-thomisticae*," three different meanings of *aliquid*. What is astonishing is that he thereby excludes the properly Thomistic meaning, namely *aliquid* understood etymologically as *aliud quid* ("another what")¹: *non est proprietas entis* [it is not a property of being], he writes².

Footnote 1 gives: "*dicitur enim aliquid quasi aliud quid*" — "*for aliquid is said as if it were 'aliud quid' [another what].*"

For *aliquid* in this meaning does indeed express something that is not yet meant by *ens* as such, namely: the being, insofar as it stands in opposition to another being. This, however, is a concept derived from *unum*, which does not follow immediately from the concept of being as such. Gredt then shows that otherness can be derived logically from unity. I imagine it should have made him suspicious that Thomas himself insists on the interpretation of *aliquid* as *aliud quid*. Gredt's remarks at this point are, then, not particularly "Thomistic."

Fernand Van Steenberghen likewise can make no proper sense of *aliquid* as *aliud quid*. He argues in his "Ontologie" that the distinctness of a being from others is confined to the domain of finite being and therefore cannot be regarded as a transcendental property of being. So Van Steenberghen simply replaces *aliquid* with *distinctum* or *determinatum*³. As with Gredt, the insight that Thomas Aquinas wanted to give expression to through the transcendental *aliquid* or *aliud quid* is thereby dismissed too hastily.

There are, as said, outside the handbooks, a few attempts to engage speculatively with Thomas's doctrine of *aliquid*. Edith Stein unfortunately commits the same error as Gredt and Van Steenberghen when, in her work "Endliches und ewiges Sein" [*Finite and Eternal Being*], she disregards Thomas Aquinas's own indication that *aliquid* is to be construed as *aliud quid*, and instead attaches to *aliquid* her own, non-Thomistic interpretation. On this she states:

If we cast a glance back at the transcendentals discussed so far, then *ens* designates the being as a whole: "that which is," but underscores therein the being; *res* brings out the What, *aliquid* the That; *unum* is a formal property belonging both to the That (= object) and to the What and to the Being.⁴

The otherness of the being in relation to another Stein holds, with Gredt, to be a determination derived from *unum*: "The object as such and as being is *one*, and on the strength of this, in relation to others, 'another'""⁵.

Walter Kern's remarks in his contribution to the Rahner Festschrift go in a more correct, more fruitful direction — certainly not least because Kern, in contrast to the authors discussed so far, takes seriously Thomas's definition of *aliquid* as *aliud quid*. Kern's fascinating indication reads as follows:

The 'aliquid' placed after the 'One' is interpreted by Thomas as "*quasi aliud quid*," as 'something Other': perhaps herein there already opens up the underlying possibility of interpreting the Other as the indispensable, most universal determination of all selfhood.⁶

This is precisely the interpretation of the transcendental *aliquid* that I would like to propose in this contribution.

Kern himself did not further develop his intimation, but it was taken up by a colleague on the other side of the Atlantic, the American philosopher Robert E. Wood. In his article “The Self and the Other: Toward a Re-Interpretation of the Transcendentals,” the latter develops, in dialogue with contemporary philosophy, a new interpretation of the Thomistic doctrine of the transcendentals, at whose center stands the transcendental *aliquid*. Starting from *aliquid*, which he correctly understands as *aliud quid*, Wood sketches in broad strokes a presentation of Thomistic thought as a dialectical system. According to Wood, Thomas’s metaphysics is built on the principle that “every being, ‘considered absolutely,’ only is insofar as it stands in relation to another”⁷. But this is a genuinely dialectical principle, indeed one would like to say: the principle of all dialectical thought as such. Summarizing his interpretation, Wood writes (original English retained):

If what we have said holds true, then Aquinas’ division of the transcendentals in terms of being considered in itself (*res* and *unum*) and of being considered in relation to another (*verum*, *bonum* and *aliquid*) has to be understood, if it is to accord with experience, in such a way that a being exists “in itself” insofar as it stands (internally) related to another — hence “outside” itself. Being then is basically ex-sistence.⁸

Although Wood’s reflections on the dialectic of self and other proceed from a Thomistic text (namely the famous list of the transcendentals in the *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, qu. 1, art. 1) and also return there, the author, by his own avowal, is in his work more concerned with “the matter itself.” Therefore, in the main part of his article, even where this would have been possible, he refrains from “documenting” with Thomistic texts the structures of being that he has uncovered through phenomenological analysis. Wood’s thesis of, for example, a directly proportional relation between selfhood and the acknowledgment of otherness⁹ is entirely Thomistic, and a comparison with Book IV, chapter 11, of the *Summa contra gentiles* could have easily shown this¹⁰.

Wood’s article, whose publication now already lies more than thirty years back, remains to this day the only halfway systematic attempt to plumb the speculative depth of the transcendental *aliquid* (as *aliud quid*) in the work of Thomas Aquinas¹¹. Josef Pieper, in a more recent article, briefly pointed to the frequent misunderstanding of *aliquid* in the Thomistic literature, without, however, doing more than merely hinting at his own interpretation¹². Jan A. Aertsen’s new, detailed study on the doctrine of the transcendentals in Thomas Aquinas touches on *aliquid* only briefly and reduces it to the concept of *multitudo* [multitude]¹³.

3. *Aliquid* in the List of the Transcendentals in the *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, qu. 1, art. 1

In his “deduction” of the transcendentals in the first article of the *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, Thomas Aquinas, as is well known, introduces *aliquid* in third place, after *res* and *unum*. Every being (*ens*), he first explains, possesses, qua being — that is, independently of its specific mode of being — an essence. Whatever it may be, it is always

“something.” This transcendental character of all being Thomas expresses with the word *res*. Beyond this, however, nothing can exist that lacked all unity. In other words, that Something of which we have just spoken is always “one” Something; however manifold its parts and forms of appearance may be, they remain related to a single center. Therefore every *ens* is a *unum*.

To be a *res* and a *unum* are the transcendental properties that belong to every being when one considers it in itself (*in se*). But now Thomas continues:

“Si autem modus entis accipiatur secundo modo, scilicet secundum ordinem unius ad alterum, hoc potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo secundum divisionem unius ab altero, et hoc exprimit hoc nomen aliquid: dicitur enim aliquid quasi aliud quid, unde sicut ens dicitur unum in quantum est indivisum in se, ita dicitur aliquid in quantum est ab aliis divisum.”¹⁴

“If, however, the mode of being is taken in the second way, namely according to the order of one to another, this can be in two ways. In one way, according to the division of one from another, and this is what this name ‘aliquid’ expresses: for aliquid is said as if it were ‘aliud quid’ [another what]; whence, just as being is called ‘one’ insofar as it is undivided in itself, so it is called ‘aliquid’ insofar as it is divided from others.”

“Dicitur enim aliquid quasi aliud quid, unde sicut ens dicitur unum in quantum est indivisum in se ita dicitur aliquid in quantum est ab aliis divisum.” — “For aliquid is said as if it were ‘aliud quid,’ whence, just as being is called ‘one’ insofar as it is undivided in itself, so it is called ‘aliquid’ insofar as it is divided from others.” That is the decisive sentence.

Just as little as a being is conceivable that would be wholly dispersed, unstructured, and thus un-unified in itself, so too can there be no being that would not differ from other beings. One can say: every being is, equiprimordially, itself and other than the others: *unum* and *aliquid*. It rests in itself, and yet it must set itself off from others; its inner unity constitutes itself in a counter-movement to outer multiplicity — a counter-movement which, however, itself presupposes multiplicity.

Let us spin this reflection out a little further. In order to be *aliquid*, “another what,” the being cannot remain wholly within itself. The centripetal movement of distinguishing-itself and setting-itself-off from the other presupposes a centrifugal movement of putting-itself-into-relation with the other. The transcendental *aliquid* thus contains a directedness-toward of the one to the other. Thomas Aquinas indeed says it himself: *aliquid* belongs to the *ordo unius ad alterum* — “the order of the one to the other.”

From the dialectic of *unum* and *aliquid* which we have just developed, it follows, then: one — itself — the being is, only as another of another. Being as such consequently exists in a circular movement out of itself — back into itself — in which it puts itself into relation with another in order, by delimiting itself from this other, to be itself. A being cannot be without this circular movement:

[Diagram in the original: “out of itself” (top) — Being A $\rightleftharpoons$ another Being B — “back into itself” (bottom), the arrows forming a circle between the two beings.]

At this point one might perhaps object to me that I have completely over-interpreted the passage from the *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate* in which Thomas discusses the transcendental *aliquid* — incidentally the only such passage in his entire work¹⁵. I do not consider this objection convincing. For several important and well-documentable doctrinal pieces of Thomas gain their full sense only against the background of the transcendental *aliquid*. I would like to elucidate this now.

4. The Transcendental *Aliquid*: Foundation of the *Reditio*

Proper being — that is, substantial being — Thomas Aquinas as a rule conceives as being-in-itself, namely in contrast to the being-in-another of accidents¹⁶. Yet there is also found in his work another, metaphysically far more fruitful, definition of substantiality as reflexive movement:

“(…) redire ad essentiam suam nihil aliud est quam rem subsistere in seipsa.”¹⁷

“(…) to return to its own essence is nothing other than for a thing to subsist in itself.”

At first glance, Thomas’s conception of the substances’ returning-to-themselves could appear vague and puzzling: for what, indeed, is meant by [the claim] that the substantiality of a substance — a stone, say — should consist in “returning to its own essence”? Yet Thomas explains, at various places in his work, very precisely wherein the *reditio* [the return] is supposed to consist for the various kinds of substances respectively, and in this connection distinguishes unensouled things, plants, animals, human beings, angels, and God. We shall return, in the next section, to the various modes of the *reditio*. It is thus not true that the doctrine of the *reditio* constitutes a marginal phenomenon in the work of Thomas Aquinas, as André Léonard thinks — an idea that he “scarcely developed,” in his words¹⁸.

Rather, the question arises why, indeed, for Thomas Aquinas all substances are essentially self-reflexive — that is, why substantiality and self-relatedness seem, for Thomas, to be synonymous. The answer to this question is given, in my conviction, by the transcendental *aliquid*. Because the identity of the being — that is, its selfhood and unity — can, for Thomas, constitute itself only in a dialectical relation to the non-identity and otherness of the other — because the *ens* is *unum* only insofar as it is, equiprimordially, an *aliud quid*, the other of another — therefore beingness or substantiality, in Thomistic thought, implies the movement of a “going-out-return”¹⁹, in which the being puts itself into relation with the other in order, by delimiting itself from it, to be itself. It is precisely this movement of the “going-out-return” that the *reditio* means.

5. The *Reditio*: Foundation of Circularity as a Cosmological Principle

For some years now, Thomas-scholarship has increasingly recognized the significance of the circulation-motif as a fundamental structure of Thomistic thought²⁰. It is not only the construction of the *Summa theologiae* which — as Marie-Dominique Chenu had already pointed out²¹ — obeys the Neoplatonic circular schema of procession and return; rather, the structure of the *Summa* is circular because the Thomistic cosmos itself is circular, both as a whole²² and in each of its parts. Thomas Aquinas's cosmology turns out, in this respect like the Aristotelian, to be “an ordering-system of graduated forms of self-relatedness”²³. I have presented these “graduated forms of self-relatedness” in detail elsewhere²⁴, and here confine myself, if only for reasons of space, to a few indications.

It was just said how difficult it is to imagine that the substantiality of a “dead” substance, such as a stone, could consist in “returning to its own essence.” *Redire*, “to return,” is, after all, a movement; and since, besides stones, there are also countless unensouled substances that possess no recognizable movement of their own, Thomas's claim that all substances are characterized by a *reditio ad essentiam suam* [*a return to their own essence*] must appear somewhat adventurous.

With regard to stones I cannot answer the question posed here concerning the *reditio* of the unensouled. Thomas, however, gives us another example of how we are to imagine the returning-to-itself of “dead” things. In the well-known chapter 11 of the fourth book of the *Summa contra gentiles*, in which Thomas presents his cosmology as a hierarchy of self-related substances in outline, he begins with a description of the unensouled substances. His example is fire:

“In rebus enim omnibus inanimata corpora infimum locum tenent: in quibus emanationes aliter esse non possunt nisi per actionem unius eorum in aliquod alterum. Sic enim ex igne generatur ignis, dum ab igne corpus extraneum alteratur, et ad qualitatem et speciem ignis perducitur.”²⁵

“For among all things, inanimate bodies hold the lowest place: among these, emanations cannot occur otherwise than through the action of one of them upon some other. For thus is fire generated from fire, when a foreign body is altered by fire and is brought to the quality and species of fire.”

The *emanatio* [*emanation, outflowing*] of an unensouled substance such as fire — that is, its specific manner of “expressing” itself as substance²⁶ — is possible only in interplay with another substance. And yet this “expression” of even dead substances, in and through “another,” is no complete “divestment” [*Ent-äußerung*] that would lead to the loss of their own identity. A fire, for example, expresses itself in its identity as fire by transforming other things into fire — a piece of wood or a sheet of paper, say, that comes into contact with it. Nevertheless this effect, directed outward, upon “another,” remains related to the identity of the fire — insofar, namely, as the other, through the effect of the fire, becomes the “Same” as the fire. Thus the fire, in its expression as substance, remains related to its own identity: it finds itself again, as fire, in its outward effect. In this consists

the self-relatedness of its emanation — a self-relatedness which, admittedly, is only generic in nature. All substances that act upon another do so in this manner — self-relatedly, that is. This is the meaning of the so important Thomistic axiom *omne agens agit sibi simile*²⁷ — “every agent acts to produce something like itself.”

The hierarchy of self-relatednesses discussed in *Summa contra gentiles* IV, 11, culminates, after an analysis of the self-reflexivity of plants, animals, human beings, and angels, in a description of the absolute self-reflexivity of God. God too returns to his own substance; he constitutes no exception to the general law of the synonymy of substantiality and *reditio*. In the *Summa theologiae* we read:

“Per se autem subsistere maxime convenit Deo. Unde secundum hunc modum loquendi, ipse est maxime rediens ad essentiam suam, et cognoscens seipsum.”²⁸

“But to subsist through itself belongs to God most of all. Whence, according to this manner of speaking, he himself is, most of all, one returning to his own essence and knowing himself.”

More than that: God too constitutes his unity and identity by means of the otherness of another: in God too, *unum* and *aliquid* are equiprimordial. In contrast, admittedly, to created substances, the *aliud* of God — through which his identity as *unus Deus* [*one God*] constitutes itself — is of one substance with himself. This *aliud* is his Word, which contains within itself the grounds of all created things. The circle of Thomistic metaphysics thus closes in the doctrine of the Trinity²⁹:

“Nam Deus intelligendo se, concipit verbum suum, quod est etiam ratio omnium intellectuum per ipsum, propter hoc quod omnia intelligit intelligendo seipsum: et ex hoc verbo procedit in amorem omnium et sui ipsius. Unde dixit quidam, quod monas monadem genuit, et in se suum reflectit ardorem. Postquam vero circulus conclusus est, nihil ultra addi potest; et ideo non potest sequi tertia processio in natura divina, sed sequitur ulterius processio in exteriorem naturam.”³⁰

“For God, in understanding himself, conceives his Word, which is also the rationale of all things understood through him, because he understands all things by understanding himself; and from this Word he proceeds into the love of all things and of himself. Whence a certain [author] said that the monad begot a monad, and reflects its own ardor into itself. But after the circle has been closed, nothing further can be added; and therefore a third procession cannot follow in the divine nature, but a further procession follows into external nature.”

6. Concluding Remark

The transcendental *aliquid* explains the Thomistic conception of substantial being as self-related being. Self-relatedness, however, is the organizing principle of the Thomistic

cosmos, both as a whole and in each of its parts. My initial claim — that *aliquid* leads us to the innermost center of the metaphysics of Saint Thomas and reveals to us its fundamental structural principle — I hold, with this, to be proven. The entire system of Thomas Aquinas can be interpreted from the transcendental *aliquid*, whereby new and interesting insights result not only for his metaphysics, theology, and cosmology, but also for his epistemology and ethics³¹. I cannot, however, go into this further here.

Notes

1. Qu. disp. de ver., qu. 1, art. 1, c (Ed. leon. XXII: 5): “*dicitur enim aliquid quasi aliud quid*” — “for aliquid is said as if it were ‘aliud quid.’”
2. J. Gredt, *Elementa philosophiae aristotelico-thomisticae*, vol. II: *Metaphysica/Ethica*, Freiburg im Breisgau 1926, 13.
3. Cf. F. Van Steenberghen, *Philosophie fondamentale*, Longueuil (Québec) 1989, 308 (Essais Collection).
4. E. Stein, *Endliches und ewiges Sein [Finite and Eternal Being]. Versuch eines Aufstiegs zum Sinn des Seins [An attempt at an ascent to the meaning of being]*, in: L. Gelber/R. Leuven (eds.), *Edith Steins Werke*, vol. 2, Löwen-Freiburg im Breisgau 1950, 270.
5. Ibid. [i.e., same source].
6. W. Kern, *Einheit-in-Mannigfaltigkeit. Fragmentarische Überlegungen zur Metaphysik des Geistes [Unity-in-Multiplicity. Fragmentary reflections on the metaphysics of spirit]*, in: J. B. Metz et al. (eds.), *Gott in Welt. Festgabe für Karl Rahner*, vol. 1, Freiburg im Breisgau-Basel-Wien 1964, 207–239 (here 214).
7. “We are going to suggest that any being ‘considered absolutely’ is only as related to another” (R. E. Wood, *The Self and the Other: Toward a Re-Interpretation of the Transcendentals*, in: *Philosophy Today* 10 [1966], 48–63, here 48). [Original English, unaltered.]
8. Ibid., 61.
9. Cf. *ibid.*, 55: “The self takes possession of itself in internal relation to the other. Owing to this relation, it is only when the otherness of the other is fully manifest that the selfhood of the self fully emerges.” On p. 56 it then says: “Since it is progressively achievable, self-identity must not be thought of as an abstract ‘A is A’ that perdures throughout many changes, but as a variable factor that is a function of our recognition of otherness.” [Original English, unaltered.]
10. See on this my interpretation in my book: *Omne ens est aliquid — “Every being is aliquid [something].” Introduction à la lecture du “système” philosophique de saint Thomas d’Aquin [Introduction to the reading of the philosophical “system” of St. Thomas Aquinas]*, Löwen-Paris 1996, 116–139.
11. S. Breton, *L’idée de transcendental [sic] et la genèse des transcendentaux [sic] chez saint Thomas d’Aquin [The idea of the transcendental and the genesis of the transcendentals in St. Thomas Aquinas]*, in: *Saint Thomas d’Aquin aujourd’hui*, Paris 1963, 45–75, does

indeed give a dialectical interpretation of the transcendentals but mentions *aliquid* only quite briefly, in passing (cf. 53 n. 1). I cannot, for reasons of space, go into the contribution by H. R. Schmitz, *Un transcendantal méconnu* [An unrecognized transcendental], in: *Cahiers Jacques Maritain* 2 (1981), 21–51, here.

12. Cf. J. Pieper, *Der Philosophierende und die Sprache* [The one who philosophizes, and language], in: id., *Werke in acht Bänden*, vol. 3: *Schriften zum Philosophiebegriff*, ed. B. Wald, Hamburg 1995, 199–211 (here 201).
13. Cf. J. A. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals. The Case of Thomas Aquinas*, Leiden-New York-Köln 1996, above all 98, 110, and 223ff. (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 52).
14. Qu. disp. de ver., qu. 1, art. 1, c (Ed. leon. XXII: 5).
15. Cf. J. A. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals* (cf. n. 13), 110.
16. Cf. e.g. In Sent., lib. I, dist. 23, qu. 1, art. 1, c, §“Ideo aliter”: “(...) *subsistere autem dicit determinatum modum essendi, prout scilicet aliquid est ens per se, non in alio, sicut accidens.*” — “(...) *but ‘to subsist’ denotes a determinate mode of being, namely insofar as something is a being through itself, not in another, as an accident [is].*”
17. S. T. I^a, qu. 14, art. 2, ad 1 (Ed. leon. IV: 168). Cf. also Qu. disp. de ver., qu. 2, art. 2, ad 2, and In Sent., lib. I, dist. 17, qu. 1, art. 5, ad 3.
18. Cf. A.-M. Léonard, *Métaphysique*, Louvain-la-Neuve, 2nd ed. 1985, 9 (typescript): “As for subsistence, T. [Thomas] defines it above all negatively: ‘we say that those things subsist which exist in themselves and not in another thing’ (ST I, 29, 2). T. sketches at times a positive definition of this ‘in-itself,’ namely the return upon itself, reflexivity, but he scarcely develops it and does not show how it applies to material substances.” [Translated from the French.]
19. Karl-Heinz Volkmann-Schluck uses this expression in connection with the dialectic of Plotinus; but it fits the Thomistic dialectic just as well — which is not surprising, since Thomas took over the concept of the *reditio* from Neoplatonism, a fact of which he is, moreover, fully aware. Cf. on this the passages listed in n. 17, and K.-H. Volkmann-Schluck, *Plotin als Interpret der Ontologie Platons* [Plotinus as interpreter of Plato’s ontology], Frankfurt/Main, 2nd ed. 1957, 125 (Philosophische Abhandlungen 10).
20. Cf. on this above all the works of Jan A. Aertsen, *The Circulation-Motive and Man in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, in: Ch. Wenin (ed.), *L’homme et son univers au moyen âge. Actes du septième congrès international de philosophie médiévale*, vol. 1, Louvain-la-Neuve 1986, 432–439 (Philosophes médiévaux 26), as well as *Nature and Creature. Thomas Aquinas’s Way of Thought*, Leiden-New York-Kopenhagen-Köln 1988 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 21).
21. Cf. M.-D. Chenu, *Introduction à l’étude de saint Thomas d’Aquin*, Montreal-Paris, 4th ed. 1984, 266–273 (Université de Montréal, Publications de l’Institut d’études médiévales 11).
22. Cf. In Sent., lib. I, dist. 14, qu. 2, art. 2, c: “*in exitu creaturarum a primo principio attenditur quaedam circulatio vel regiratio, eo quod omnia revertuntur sicut in finem in*

id a quo sicut a principio prodierunt.” — “*in the going-forth of creatures from the first principle a certain circulation or turning-back is observed, in that all things return, as to their end, into that from which, as from a principle, they proceeded.*”

23. K. Oehler, *Der Unbewegte Beweger des Aristoteles* [The unmoved mover of Aristotle], Frankfurt am Main 1984, 93 (Philosophische Abhandlungen 52).
24. Cf. on this the book named in n. 10, as well as my study: *Omne agens agit sibi simile: A “Repetition” of Scholastic Metaphysics*, Löwen 1996, 253–278 (Louvain Philosophical Studies 12).
25. S.c.g., lib. IV cap. 11 (Ed. leon. XV: 32).
26. Let us not forget: “*res unaquaeque dicitur esse propter suam operationem*” (S. T. I^{ae} IIae, qu. 3, art. 2, c; Ed. leon. VI: 27) — “*each single thing is said to exist on account of its operation.*”
27. Cf. e.g., among many other passages, S. T. I^a, qu. 4, art. 3, c (Ed. leon. IV: 54): “*Cum enim omne agens agat sibi simile in quantum est agens, agit autem unumquodque secundum suam formam, necesse est quod in effectum sit similitudo formae agentis.*” — “*For since every agent acts to produce something like itself insofar as it is an agent, and each thing acts according to its own form, it is necessary that in the effect there be a likeness of the form of the agent.*” On this in detail: P. W. Rosemann, *Omne agens agit sibi simile* (cf. n. 24).
28. S. T. I, qu. 14, art. 2, ad 1 (Ed. leon. IV: 169).
29. I agree, then, with Jan A. Aertsen that Thomas’s metaphysics does not become fully intelligible without his doctrine of the Trinity. Cf. J. A. Aertsen, *Nature and Creature* (cf. n. 13), 379–384.
30. Qu. disp. de pot., qu. 9, art. 9, c.
31. Cf. P. W. Rosemann, *Omne ens est aliquid* (cf. n. 10).